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 A wind of privatisation has blown over most
of the world. In former communist countries
in Eastern Europe, entire industries that
formerly were state-owned have been sold to
the private sector. In Western Europe, politi-
cians and economists alike have advocated
private rather than public ownership, and
privatisation of large state monopolies for
instance in the telecom and energy sector has
followed. For other institutions within the
public sector, like universities and hospitals,
there seems to have been a move towards more
independence and less direct control by the
government.
This wave of privatisation is mostly based
on faith rather than on sound economic
theories (Schmidt 1996). From a theoretical
perspective, it turns out to be rather difficult
to see why the government in principle cannot
run a firm as efficiently as private owners,
since the government has the option of
running the state-owned firm in the same
manner as a private firm does. In principle,
the government as an owner of a firm can
align the managers interests with its own in
the same way as in a private firm. By providing
the manager with the right incentives and
with the authority to design incentive schemes
for his or her subordinates, the government
may manipulate the behaviour of the firm. If
the government's only interest is the revenues
the firm creates, the government should
provide the manager with the same incentive
contract as would private owners, and thereby
enjoy the same revenues. On the other hand,
if the government for instance due to market
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We study public ownership from the perspective of political economics. A partly partisan
government runs a state-owned firm. The number of employees the government wants to
hire depends both on economic conditions and on the preferences of the government,
both unknown to the electorate. The government's policy towards the state-owned firm
gives a signal of its preferences, and may thereby influence the probability that the
government is re-elected. As a result, the governance of the firm becomes inefficient and
static, in the sense that it does not react adequately to changing economic conditions.
JEL-codes: D21, D82, L33failures has preferences over other issues than
profits, the contract with the manager should
reflect this. The state-owned firm may then
perform better (from the government's point
of view) than the private, profit maximising
firm. Note the analogy with the claims in
Lange and Taylor (1938) that a socialist
economy can always do as well as and may do
better than the market economy.
In the literature, several shortcomings in
the arguments above have been pointed out,
see Laffont and Tirole (1993). Firstly, private
firms frequently use equity-based perfor-
mance measures, like stocks and stock
options. A publicly owned firm is not traded
and thus does not have a market value. A
counter argument to this is that the market
value of a state-owned firm may be estimated
by a third party like a consultancy firm (or
several consultancy firms), and the bonus to
the manager could in principle be tied to this
estimation. Alternatively, the government
may decide to allow a small share of the firm
to be publicly traded just to get a market price.
Note also that share and option programs to
top managers do not seem to play a crucial
role in Norway.
Secondly, public ownership excludes
bilateral strategic investments and alliances
with other firms. The Norwegian state-owned
oil company Statoil claims that it wants to
trade shares with the French oil company Elf
and that this is important for the company.
More generally, there exists a market for
ownership, and if this market functions well,
the resulting ownership structure should be
optimal. By deciding up-front that a firm is
state-owned, the firm in question is excluded
from this market. We will not claim that these
issues are not important. However, the
economics profession has not yet developed a
coherent and operative theory on why
ownership matters and even less so on the
benefits of cross-ownership.
Finally, the argument that the owners may
govern the firm through contracts may be
weakened if it is impossible to write complete
contracts. In this case, ownership may matter.
Schmidt (1996) argues that the owner of a
firm has superior information regarding this
firm. If the government owns a company, the
government cannot constrain itself from
using this information when beneficial
\emph{ex post}. In a world of incomplete
contracts this may be harmful \emph{ex ante}
and may reduce the manager's incentives to
undertake investments. Although this result
is interesting and important, it may be
difficult to believe that the drawback of state
ownership is that the state as an owner obtains
too much information. Hart, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997) focus on ownership as a
residual right of control, that is, who has the
right to decide in contingencies not covered
by the contract. It is argued that with
incomplete contracts it may be optimal that
the manager owns the company rather than
the government. The argument is that this
improves the incentives to make cost-
reducing innovations. However, when quality
of the service produced by the agency is hard
to verify, the incentives of private contractors
may be toostrong since they ignore the adverse
impact on quality. In some situations, there-
fore, the low powered incentives of public
ownership is desirable in order to maintain
quality. In their model, therefore, the proper
scope of governmental ownership is based on
evaluation of these costs and benefits of low
powered incentives, i.e. the importance of
innovation verus quality.
Political signalling
In this paper, we develop an alternative reason
as to why public ownership may be inefficient.
We do not claim that it is impossible for the
government to run a firm as efficiently as
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whether the government has incentives to do
so. More specifically, we argue that a political
system with elections does not give the
government incentives to run the state-owned
firm in an efficient manner. Inefficiently run
state-owned firms are thus a result of political
failure.
Our main argument is related to political
signalling. The idea behind political signalling
is that the government has preferences over
what kind of policy it wants to implement
and that the electorate has imperfect
information about these preferences. Thus,
the electorate will continuously update their
beliefs about the preferences of the govern-
ment by observing its behaviour. The
electorate's beliefs about the preferences of
the government may in turn influence their
voting behaviour. Politicians know this, and
take the signalling effects into account when
deciding on policy.
Suppose, for example, that the govern-
ment changes the wage contract of the top-
managers in a state-owned firm, introduces
competitive salaries, (potentially) huge
bonuses, introduces attractive retirement
packages, parachutes, golden coffins etc. This
may easily influence the electorate's beliefs
about the government's preferences more
generally; it will be interpreted as sign that
the government is pro-business, cares about
the rich and wealthy, and does not care about
income distribution. This may happen even
if it is rational to give such compensation
packages and this is understood by the people.
Similarly, if a government downsizes
dramatically or closes down a large public
firm, sending thousands on the dole, it may
signal that the government finds this
acceptable and that the fate of its employees
(and employees in general?) is not important.
If the government allows a state-owned firm
to discharge pollutants, it may signal that the
government does not care about pollution,
even if the emissions were legal. If the
government allows the firm to export /import
in countries with dubious regimes, it may
signal that these regimes can be tolerated. The
list goes on. A government that cares about
re-election will obviously take the signalling
effect of its actions into account, as this will
influence its chances for re-election. Thus,
because political as well as economic
considerations influence the way state-owned
firms are run, the firms may not be governed
effectively from an economic point of view.
Before we continue, note that political
signalling is not new within political
economics. Cukierman and Tommasi (1998)
analyse the incentives of governments
representing different political parties in a
relatively general setting. In their model,
parties have private information about their
preferences (and economic fundamentals),
and the incumbent party distorts his policy
proposal in order to conceal his true type. In
Harrington (1993), the voters know the
parties' preferences, but they are uncertain
about the parties' beliefs about how the
economy works. Schultz (1996) analyses how
parties may have an incentive to misrepresent
the cost of providing public services. In his
model, voters know the parties' valuation of a
public good, but not the costs of providing
the good. Before the election, each party
announces policies (the level of the public
good). In a pooling equilibrium, the parties'
announced policy does not vary with the costs
of production. In Swank (1998), an
incumbent party signals the cost of providing
the public good by its actual policy prior to
the election. The key innovation of present
paper is that it links political signalling to
state ownership. State ownership implies that
politicians (or those appointed by politicians)
are governing the firm. Hence, decisions made
by the firm represent the will of the
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how this link may lead to inadequate response
by state-owned firms to a changing business
environment.
The paper is organised as follows: in the
next section we present the model. The
equilibrium in this model is discussed in
section 5. The paper concludes with a
discussion of relevance of the model and the
consequences of our findings in section 6.
The model
The economy consists of two sectors. The
private sector consists of privately owned
firms and the state-owned sector consists of a
large state-owned firm. The government may
influence employment by different means. In
the state-owned sector, the government is by
definition the owner of the firm, and,
therefore, holds the right to make employ-
ment decisions. Before we add political
interests to problem, there are two important
effects of employment decisions in the state-
owned firm. First, the profitability of firm is
affected. By choosing an efficient employ-
ment level, costs are reduced and profits
increases. Since profits are used to finance
public goods, this is appreciated by the
government (everything else equal). Second,
assuming a rigid labour market, a down-sizing
decision causes increased unemployment in
the state-owned sector. This gives rise to
social, as well as economic costs.
The government may also manipulate
employment in the private sector by the
government. By subsidising training or
employment, investing in employment
agencies and so on, the government is able to
reduce employment. Again the cost of this
policy is a lower production of public goods
(for a given tax level).
How the government prefers to handle the
trade-off between a high employment level
and a high level of public spending on other
issues depends on the political preferences,
i.e. how much weight the government gives
to low unemployment relative to high public
consumption. This is assumed to be unknown
to the voters prior to election. This may be
because these preferences change (although
slowly) over time.
Furthermore, we also assume that the
government is better informed about the costs
of a high-employment policy in the state-
owned firm. This  may depend on factors such
as production technology and demand.
Following Schmidt (1996), the owner of a
firm (i.e., the government) is assumed to have
superior information regarding these factors.
For simplicity we assume that the two sectors
are completely separated, and no workers
move between the sectors (however, this is
not necessary for our results to go through).
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The government observes the trade-off
between employment and profitability in
the state-owned firm.
2. The government chooses employment in
the state-owned firm, or equivalently the
unemployment level in this sector u0.
3. The electorate observes u0, and updates
its beliefs about the government's
preferences.
4. An election is held.
5. If the government is elected, it implements
its preferred policy in the private sector,
i.e. chooses up.
We assume that the incumbent party's
preferences do not change over the election.
Thus, the electorate may learn about the
incumbent party's preferences by observing
its employment policy in the state-owned
sector. Still, the observed employment policy
is at best a noisy signal of political preferences
since the electorate does not know the trade-
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state-owned firm.
Technology and preferences of the
incumbent party 
Let the parameter g reflect the trade-off
between employment and profit in the state
owned-firm, which is private information to
the government. A high value of g means that
hiring people is more costly in terms of
reduced profit in the state-owned firm. We
assume that the preferences of the government
depend on a parameter e that is unknown to
the electorate. A high value of e reflects that
the party gives less weight to low unemploy-
ment (“right-wing”), while a low value of e
reflects the opposite (“left-wing”). Note that
e =0 refers to a neutral case in which the
government's expected preferences are mode-
rate (neither right-wing nor left-wing). If e<0,
there is a left-wing bias in the electorate's
belief about the incumbent party, whereas e>0
capture a right-wing bias in the electorate's
belief. Let a denote the state-owned firm's
weight in the economy. Finally, let Π denote
the intrinsic (stay-in-office motivated) value
for the incumbent of winning the election.
These parameters are introduced in a reduced-
form representation of the incumbent's
preferences:1
W= – a[u0– (u*+e+g)]2+
p[Π – (1–a)(up – (u*+e))2]                      (1)
The first term reflects preferences regarding
the pre-election policy of the state-owned
firm. Everything else being equal, the
government would prefer to set u0=u*+e + g
:=u. The second term reflects the preferences
over policy conducted after the election. With
probability  p the government wins the
election. If so, it will cash in Π just to stay in
office. In addition, the government has
preferences over the employment level in the
private sector, reflected in the second part of
the last term. After the election, the govern-
ment implements its favoured policy, e, and
the last term simplifies to pΠ. Note that the
incumbent has no preferences over what
policy the opponent will implement if he
wins. The assumption simplifies the algebra,
and is rationalised by the fact that a party after
an electoral defeat often reorganises and
change political platform (and thus prefe-
rences) anyway.2
Voters' preferences
Each voter has a preferred policy ui showing
his preferred unemployment rate in the
private sector (his preferences for employment
in the state-owned sector is irrelevant as this
decision has already been taken when they go
to the ballot boxes). We assume that there are
only two parties, and since political prefe-
rences are one-dimensional and single-
peaked, it follows that the median voter
theorem holds. We denote the median voter's
preferences (that is, his preferred unemploy-
ment rate in the private sector) by um. In order
to avoid too strong results we introduce
probabilistic voting, which means that the
politicians do not exactly know the
preferences of the median voter. We formalise
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1. Our formulation indicates that not only overall unemployment, but also the distribution of unemployment over
different submarkets matter. As will be clear later, we assume that the marginal costs of unemployment are in-
creasing, and that (for a given overall unemployment rate) both the government and the electorate prefer the
unemployment rate to be the same in the two sectors.
2. Schultz (1995) argues that the incumbent party is likely to care about social welfare mainly when reelected.this by assuming that the median voter's
preferences are drawn from a uniform
distribution [u*– c,u* + c], where c >1.
The electorate has no information about
the opposition's preferences, and thus
assumes that it is equal to u* (see below). If
the electorate, after observing uo, draws the
conclusion that the incumbent politician's
preferred unemployment rate is u', the
incumbent politician is preferred by the
median voter if and only if |um– u*|>|um – u'|,
which happens with probability 
1| u'-u*|
p(u')= – –––––                                      (2)
2     4c
Importantly, it follows that the incumbent's
probability of winning is maximised if the
electorate believes that the government's bliss
point (preferred policy) is equal to 0. With
no loss of generality, we simplify notation by
normalising u* to zero in the remaining
sections. u*.
Equilibrium policy
Based on this simple set up, it is possible to
derive some implications for political owner-
ship.
Proposition 1 The employment decision in the
state-owned firm does not respond to changes in
the business environment. 
A formal proof based on simplifying
assumptions about e and g is offered in the
appendix. Here we give the intuition. The
state-owned firm becomes static. Although
all parties would like the employment in the
state-owned firm to vary with the business
environment, political competition towards
the next election makes them unwilling to
respond. The reason is that the voters cannot
observe party preferences e and business
environment  g. If they observe high
unemployment in the state owned sector, the
voters cannot observe whether this is because
the party in position gives low priority to
employment or the business environment
makes this a very profitable action. However,
the rational voter will find it more likely that
the party gives low priority to employment.
Since signalling of extreme preferences in
either directions is costly in terms of reduced
election probability, we end up with passive
political owners. A consequence of static state-
owned firms, is that the electorate does not
learn (or gets more information) about the
preferences of the government. Although this
is costly for the government, as it sincerely
wants the state-owned firm to react to a
changing business environment (as seen in
the first part of the objective function), the
cost of allowing for a flexible policy rule in
terms of a reduced probability of re-election
is even bigger.
It is important to note that this result is
not driven by an assumption that the
government is populistic and only want to
stay in office. A purely office-motivated
government of this kind has no incentives
other than doing whatever the median voter
prefers at any time, and as it has no political
preferences of its own it has nothing to signal.
Our results actually hinge on our assumption
that the government is partisan and really
wants to push through its preferred policy
after the election. This is why it is important
for the electorate to know the true preferences
of the competing political parties and why
signalling is meaningful. This gives us a strong
indication that the state-owned firm is
inefficiently run. To be more specific, consider
all preferences on the same form as in (1), that
is, on the form
W= – Ea[u0– (u*+e+g)]2
for some value of e, where the expectation is
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rule for the state-owned firm, A, is a political
failure in the state-owned sector if there exists
a different policy rule, B, which is preferred
for all and strictly preferred for some political
preferences within this preference class.
Furthermore, in this case we also say that
policy rule B dominates policy rule A. Note
that if the government can commit to a policy
rule, there will be no political signalling, and
the probability that the government wins the
election is 1/2.
With the simplifying assumption made in
the appendix, it is easy to show that there is a
political failure. The centrist policy rule
dominates the equilibrium policy rule:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium policy rule is a
political failure, as it is dominated by the centrist
policy rule which sets uo=u*+g
Finally, one may argue that the distortions
created in the state-owned firm may be
worthwhile if the electorate, because of
signalling, learns about the preferences of the
government and thereby is able to make better
policy choices. However, in our model there
is no learning, as the government always
choose the same policy. Therefore, signalling
has no value in our set-up.
So far we have assumed that the electorate
initially believes that the government is
centrist. If we change this assumption we may
obtain even stronger results. For instance,
suppose the electorate becomes more rightist
and business friendly. In this case, the leftist
parties may have an incentive to go for a right-
wing policy towards the state-owned firms to
signal their new preferences. However, the
desire to signal may lead the leftist govern-
ment to pursue a right-wing policy of low
employment in the state-owned firms even if
the business conditions actually call for a more
leftist policy. Furthermore, in order to signal
truthfully, the leftist party may actually have
to oversell its message by choosing a policy
that is to the right of the preferred policy for
a right-wing party. In any case, the policy
towards the state-owned firm is static and
insensitive to the economic environment.
Finally, if the electorate's preferences
change over time the government, in an effort
to show that they are still in line with the
median voter, may govern the state-owned
firm in a way that is erratic and inconsistent
over time. More generally, one variable cannot
optimally serve two purposes, and if the
governance of a state-owned firm is used as a
signalling device one cannot at the same time
expect the decisions made to be consistent
with optimal ownership.
In our model, the government owns only one
firm. What we refer to as the firm may, of
course, be interpreted as an industry (or all
state-owned firms) rather than a single firm.
In this case, the employment decision con-
cerns aggregate employment. Alternatively,
we may still interpret the state-owned firm as
one of many state-owned firms, if it is so that
the status of the firm will be brought to the
electorate's attention only if changes in
employment are about to take place. This
seemed to be the case with the steel plants in
Norway and the coal mines in the U.K. It
may also be that only a fraction of the
electorate cares about the employment deci-
sions in a local state-owned firm. Signalling
through the employment decision may still
be worthwhile if the issue is sufficiently
important for these voters.
We have chosen to focus on the employ-
ment decision as an instrument for signalling.
However, as discussed above, the government
may also signal through other decision
variables related to their governance of the
state-owned firm. If the government hands
out large bonuses or golden parachutes to the
top executives in the state-owned firms, this
Public ownership as a signalling device 9may easily be interpreted as a right-wing
signal, and the same is true if the government
introduces strong elements of performance
pay more generally. Our signalling story thus
implies that the decision to introduce such
measures may be distorted through the same
kind of mechanism as described above.
Concluding remarks
Most of the previous literature on public
ownership adopt the incomplete-contract
paradigm to investigate the why and how
public ownership matter. This paper takes
another perspectives by focusing on the
politicians care about the next election.
Politicians wants to convince the voters that
the preferences of the party is not in conflict
with the voters' preferences. By public
ownership, the politicians becomes the owner
of the firms. Hence, the observed perfor-
mance of the state-owned firm will send
messages to the voters about political
preferences. The main result is that this create
inefficiencies.
The obvious remedy to reduce problems
related to signalling is to create a distance
between the government and the state-owned
firm. One may thereby reduce the connection
between the government's preferences and
the governance of the state-owned firm,
thereby reducing the scope for signalling.
However, creating a distance between the
government and the state-owned firm may
easily create problems of its own. Firstly, the
reason as to why the firm is state-owned in
the first place may well be because it is
regarded as important for society that the
firm's activities are controlled by the
government, for instance if there is a large
discrepancy between the private and the social
value of the firm's output. Finally, creating a
distance between the owners of the firm and
the firm may create weak owners and strong
managers, which creating its own set of
problems.
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Appendix
In this section, we characterise the equili-
brium of the model after imposing the
following restrictions on the model:
•  Preferences: Parties are either left-wing
(e = –1), centre (e = 0) or right-wing (e =
1).
•  Technology: The technology parameter g
is either –1 (employment is “cheap”), g =0
(cost of employment intermediate), or g =
–1 (employment is costly). Each state is
equally likely. In addition (and for
10 Dag Morten Dalen, Espen R. Moen and Christian Riistechnical reasons), with a small probability
ε, the value of g is –2, and with the same
probability +2.
•  Policies: The incumbent party, when
deciding on employment in the state-
owned firm, has three alternatives to
choose from: uo=u*, uo=u*–1oruo=u*+1.
This corresponds to the optimal policy for
a centrist government when the conditions
are normal ( g =0), good ( g = –1) or bad (
g =1). We assume that u=u* ± 2 is not an
option. This is to simplify the analysis, but
it can also be rationalised by the fact that
there may be limits as to how quickly it is
possible to change policy (hence the span
of possibilities is limited).
•  Parameters: We assume that a < Π /12c.
This means that winning the election is
important relative to governing the state-
owned firm well. At the same time, we
assume that a > Π /20c. Thus, there is a
limit on how badly a government
(according to its own preferences) is
willing to run the state-owned firm.
•  Initial beliefs: Initially, the electorate
believes that the government is moderate
(as for the opponent)3
We will now set up the following set of beliefs
of the electorate, which will be justified in
equilibrium:
1. Suppose the incumbent party chooses
high employment in the state-owned firm.
Then the electorate updates its beliefs
about the preferences of the incumbent
party, and believes with certainty that it is
leftist (e = –1).
2.  Symmetrically, if the policy chosen for the
state-owned firm is low unemployment,
the electorate believes with certainty that
the government is rightist (e = 1).
3. If the policy chosen is intermediate
unemployment, the electorate does not
update their beliefs.
Given these beliefs, it is costly for the
incumbent government to increase or
decrease employment in the state-owned firm.
If they do so, the electorate will recognise
them as leftist or rightist, and the probability
of being elected falls from 1/2 to 1/2 – 1
4c, that
is, with 1
4c units (from (2). Thus, the cost of
choosing a leftist (or a rightist) policy caused
by a reduced probability of re-election is  Π
4c
(from equation 1).
Consider first the party at the centre (the
centrist party). Suppose that business
conditions call for a moderate employment
level in the state-owned firms. The intrinsi-
cally best policy for the centrist party towards
the state-owned firm will then be to go for
moderate employment and set u=u*.
Furthermore, since this also maximises the
probability of re-election, it is surely the
preferred policy. Exactly the same is true
whenever the party is leftist and the business
environment calls for low employment (e =
–1 and g =1) and when the party is rightist
and the business environment calls for high
employment (e =1 and g = –1).
The problem, however, arises when
business conditions call for a different policy.
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3. This may be given two interpretations. Firstly, the government's prior may have almost all the probability mass
at e = 0. However, for technical reasons e = –1 and e = +1 must be in the support as well. Secondly, if the elec-
torate's preferences are linear in the unemployment rate, it is sufficient to assume that the prior is symmetri-
cally distributed, as this will ensure that the electorate will vote on the basis of the expected policy onlySuppose g=–1, in which case the intrinsically
best policy towards the state-owned firm for
both the centrist and the leftist party is to set
employment high (u low). The gain from this
will be a for the centrist and 3a for the leftist
party (the loss with u=u* is equal to 4a, while
the loss with u=u*–1 is only a, hence the
difference is 3a). However, by doing so the
electorate will draw the conclusion that the
government is leftist, and as we have seen this
reduces the probability of winning the
election. The associated expected cost is (as
we have seen) given by  Π
4c. By assumption, a
< Π
12c, and it follows that it is optimal to set
uo=u* for both the centrist and the leftist
argument. For exactly the same reason, the
centrist and the rightist party will chose uu=u*
even if the business environment calls for
lower employment.
Finally, by assumption there is an
arbitrarily small probability εthat the business
conditions are extremely good, that is, that g
= –2. In this case, the cost of choosing
moderate employment for the leftist
government is 5a (the loss when choosing
u=u* is 9a, while the loss when choosing u=u*
–1 is 4a, hence the difference is 5a), and (given
our assumptions on parameters) this
outweighs the costs Π/4c. Thus, in this case
the leftist party will follow its ideology and go
for high employment. The centrist or the
right-wing party, however, will not do so. The
intrinsic gain for the centrist party of choosing
high employment rather than moderate
employment (u = u* –1 instead of u = u*) is
3a, which (as we have seen) is less than the
cost associated with a lower probability of re-
election. A centrist government will therefore
still choose moderate employment. The same
certainly holds if the incumbent party is
rightist. Finally, by symmetry it follows that
if the business environment is extremely bad
(g=2), only the rightist party will deviate from
the moderate employment policy and reduce
the employment in the state-owned firm.
In what follows, we focus on the limit
equilibrium that arises when ε → 0. Then the
electorate's posterior beliefs are rational. We
have thus shown the proposition 1.
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